structure SettlementEconomy where
/-- |∂f_φ/∂S| > 0: settlement infrastructure attracts mesh adoption.
From eq. (5): ∂f_φ/∂S = γ_φ · φ(1-φ) · ∂μ_φ/∂S. -/
cross_phi_S : ℝ
h_cross_phi_S : 0 < cross_phi_S
/-- |∂f_S/∂φ| > 0: mesh participation generates settlement demand.
From eq. (6): ∂f_S/∂φ = γ_S · S · g'_mesh(φ). -/
cross_S_phi : ℝ
h_cross_S_phi : 0 < cross_S_phi
/-- |∂f_φ/∂φ| > 0: logistic self-damping of mesh adoption.
Negative eigenvalue contribution at stable equilibrium. -/
self_phi : ℝ
h_self_phi : 0 < self_phi
/-- |∂f_S/∂S| > 0: stablecoin depreciation and attrition (δ_S).
Negative eigenvalue contribution at stable equilibrium. -/
self_S : ℝ
h_self_S : 0 < self_SPaper 7: Settlement Feedback and Monetary Policy in a Mesh Economy